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"...all legal systems must have a set of rules to govern the making and 
enforcement of agreements, and we hope that much of what we say about the 
English law of contract will have parallels in the law of contract in other legal 
systems." (Harris and Veljanovski 1986:109) 
"...in negotiating the settlement...it is a waste of time and expense to investigate 
the precise legal position It would clearly not make economic sense to 
settle all contractual disputes out-of-court...[but] An appreciation of this 
situation should lead contract lawyers to the conclusion that legal rules on 
remedies for breach of contract should be designed to take into account the fact 
that in the vast majority of cases the rules will be used to guide out-of-court 
settlements and to induce compromises." (ibid., pp. 116-117) 
I. Introduction 
This book seeks to pull together two approaches to institutions, those of law and 
organizational theory. As an economist, I stand somewhat apart from both of those 
approaches. Within economics, law on the one hand is presumed to provide an essential 
support for "market" transactions, but the nature of that support is seldom specified. On the 
other hand, organizational studies focus upon "hierarchy," the locus of most day-to-day 
economic activity in the U.S. Economics, however, typically treats organizations as a black 
box that is best left unopened. Here my focus is on the presumed centrality of contract law, 
drawing upon empirical work on the Japanese auto industry (Smitka, 1991). 
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My analysis draws upon the transactions cost approach of Coase (1992) and 
Williamson (1985), and recent work in game theory (various chapters in Gambetta, 1988). 
Ironically, in their work Coase and Williamson retreat to an analysis based on the formal 
structure of Law and of the organization of the Firm. While these provide a convenient 
starting point, one motivation for this book is the need to understand a world in which these 
pure structures cannot be empirically isolated. Indeed, neither law nor organization by 
themselves provide an adequate theoretical framework for understanding the base on which 
transactions are grounded. Thus economics as a field can benefit from — and by providing 
another perspective, contribute to — a richer research paradigm. 
In the following I argue from my own empirical work, which highlights the 
pervasiveness of complex, deep-reaching interactions among firms that maintain many of the 
features of intraorganizational transactions. As such, they fall outside the realm of 
"hierarchy," but are also outside the scope of the "market" of neoclassical economics and the 
classical contract theory in law. However, I believe that the "relational" contracting and 
"network" organizational forms that are central to the Japanese auto industry are typical of 
economic transactions in general. 
The central feature I see in such transactions is both the necessity for and the 
possibility of relying upon trust among parties, where legal remedies are too awkward and 
ineffective to be central. (See likewise Black, 1976:40, who as a sociologist argues that law 
will be comparatively dormant when interdependence is central.) But if trust is effective --
and by "trust" I mean a willingness to act in reliance on the other party, where circumstances 
do not compel them to be trustworthy - then what constructive role can contract law play? 
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(Similarly, then in what way is formal organization -- the firm — important?) These are 
clearly extreme positions, but taking them as a starting point will, I believe, lead both to 
better empirical work and to more precise theory. In the conclusion I briefly look at issues 
that my own and other recent studies of contracting raise for organizational studies. The bulk 
of this chapter, however, will focus upon the role of law. 
Briefly, I posit that law -- or more precisely, contract law - is unnecessary. In other 
words, contracting — the framing of the environment for transactions — is quite possible 
without Contracts, the potential for legal enforcement of the agreements that accompany 
transactions. Indeed, I argue that the Japanese economy is best characterized as functioning 
without Contract. (See Haley, 1991, for parallel arguments about the overall role of law in 
the Japanese polity.) At least when Japan's performance is viewed from afar, it is easy to 
presume that economic efficiency suffers little or may even be enhanced in such a "lawless" 
society. Let it suffice that Japan demonstrates that it is possible to have a complex, vigorous 
economy without contract law and associated legal institutions playing a central role. 
As noted, the null hypothesis that law is irrelevant runs against the grain of legal 
scholarship. It does, however, serve a useful purpose by forcing careful arguments for how 
law actually matters. One role that I believe law should play is to suggest how transactions 
ought to be framed to encourage trust and avoid dispute-prone situations. In this normative 
and pedagogic role, drawing up a contract serves primarily as a check that each side has 
thought through the core business elements, to try to assure that both parties have an ex ante 
interest in carrying through their end of the deal. The training of lawyers in the U.S., 
however, stresses the importance of Contracts over contracting, that is, the need for protection 
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should things go wrong over the prevention of things going wrong. The emphasis on 
carefully drafting a document all too often diverts the parties' attention from the business at 
hand. Indeed lawyers, in a careful professional stance, will claim that their purview should 
be limited to narrow legal advice. I believe this combination produces unnecessary (if for 
lawyers fruitful) levels of dispute. 
Second, the prevalence of complex transactions, and the often tenuous connection that 
Contracts bear to the real world of business contracting (a point long ago made by Macaulay, 
1963), should serve as a cautionary tale for the ability of courts to resolve disputes. In one 
sense, this is what lies behind the death of classical contract law that Gilmore (1977) portrays 
as occurring through the accretion of exceptions to the classical doctrine, stemming from the 
willingness of courts to try to handle increasingly complex cases. Ironically, this may have 
made matters worse, because it creates pressures for more specialized and complex documents 
and hence a greater role for lawyers. Instead, a greater reticence by courts to attempt to 
resolve disputes would encourage parties to exercise more care up front. 
However, restricting the role of the legal system makes sense only if it is indeed 
practical in most situations to rely upon trust and relational mechanisms to support 
contracting. There are situations — fraud, incompetence ~ that are appropriately recognized 
under current contract law (or shifted over to Torts). We may as a society wish to provide 
protection to "small" parties who find it hard to self-insure through numerous independent 
transactions, and who have neither the resources nor the experience to carefully craft 
transactions. (In fact, reforms to make available "small claims" procedures are now being 
discussed in Japan.) But I think that such situations should be viewed as exceptions to the 
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general rule, and that the granting of these exceptions should be grounded in careful 
theoretical and empirical work. 
This argument is in accord in many ways with the findings of the Wisconsin school. 
Macaulay (1963) stresses the divergence between what contract law says and what 
businessmen do; Macneil (1985) argues that the contract law conception of a world of "spot" 
transactions is at variance with the pervasiveness of "relational" contracting. Both, however, 
start from the presumption that law matters or ought to matter, that the real world operates 
under the shadow of the law. Closer in spirit is the recent study of Ellickson (1991), who 
highlights how (in his case) neighbors settle disputes outside of the shadow of the law, and 
why non-neighbors in similar situations may have recourse to law. 
With these themes in mind, let me now leave Contracts behind and turn my attention 
to the world of contracting. In the conclusion I will briefly turn my skeptical eye to studies 
of the Firm. 
II. Transactions and Trust 
The Larger Literature 
Many fine studies of contracting and interfirm organization have appeared in the past five 
years; most of these are of manufacturing, and many were stimulated by an interest in 
reputedly distinctive Japanese practices. (Much of this work is also informed by if not 
inspired by Williamson, 1975, 1985.) Along with my study of the Japanese automotive 
industry, there is Helper's (1991) work on the U.S. auto industry, Sako's (1993) book on 
British printed circuit board makers, Nishiguchi's (1993) book on autos and consumer 
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electronics, Lorenz's paper (1988) on French machine builders, Dore's (1986) book on the 
Japanese textile industry, and Joskow's (1985) analysis of coal markets. In addition to these 
studies by economists and sociologists are a series of anthropological studies of wholesale 
food markets — Acheson (1991) on Maine lobsters, Bestor (1993) on Tokyo's seafood market, 
and Silin (1972) on Hong Kong produce markets.[l] 
Two common themes are found in these studies. One is an emphasis on the wider 
context of the relationship; the atomistic "spot" transactions envisioned in classical contract 
theory (and the atomistic, anonymous markets of introductory microeconomics) are not what 
one finds in the real world. (Again, note Macneil, 1985.) Another implicit and often explicit 
theme of these recent studies is the role of "trust" in contracting. Virtually any economic 
transaction requires that parties rely upon each other, that one or both sides place themselves 
at risk. Formal contracts can highlight where risks lie, and provide penalties for reneging. 
But contracts in themselves are inadequate to produce active compliance, and provide little 
guidance on how to adjust terms when problems arise but (as typically is the case) both sides 
still wish to carry through. Trust can help parties muddle through; contracts invite conflict. 
But these are only a few of the facets of trust; for other examples, see the Gambetta (1988) 
volume Trust, my own study (1991:Chapter 6), Sako (1991) and Sitkin and Roth 
(forthcoming). 
To reiterate, the thrust of these studies is that contracts are neither sufficient nor even 
necessary to provide assurance of performance. Indeed, below I make two simple, primarily 
empirical, claims. The first is that trust is not primarily a cultural phenomenon. It is 
certainly true that goodwill is widespread in Japanese and American society — as stressed by 
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(respectively) Dore (1983, 1986) and Macaulay (1963) — while a cultural legacy of distrust of 
others is similarly a barrier to development in many ethnically diverse societies. Clearly, 
without trust there is no civilization. But in business mere goodwill is insufficient; for 
example, the village and ethnic ties in Silin's (1977) Hong Kong wholesale market, and the 
familial ties in Bestor's (1993) Tokyo fish market, provided at most a common starting point. 
Whatever the social or cultural foundation, parties invest much time and energy to develop 
trust, as a conscious part of their business strategy. 
Indeed, the ability to deliberately foster trust leads to my second point, that trust offers 
an effective substitute to law as a basis of contracting. Parties require a concrete reason to 
trust each other, to risk non-performance by the other party. Such trust can be, and in Japan 
is, deliberately fostered through appropriate contracting strategies, which I sketch below. I 
believe, furthermore, that similar strategies can be employed in the U.S. Trust then in general 
offers a viable alternative to Contracts — indeed, trust is necessary even with Contracts. But 
in that event the Hobbesian specter of chaos in the absence of law reduces to a ghostly mist. 
The opposite problem may be more important: law imposes an artificial structure upon 
contracting that all too often blinds parties to the need and the potential for crafting 
transactions in a manner that facilitates trust, as Sitkin and Roth (forthcoming) also argue. 
Contracting in Japan 
As is reasonably well known, lawyers play a small role in Japanese society. The Bar is kept 
small; only about 600 individuals a year pass the written exam and go on to the mandatory 
legal apprenticeship. As a result, Japan with a population of 125 million has approximately 
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14,000 lawyers, or fewer than Manhattan. Furthermore, from this group are drawn not only 
the nation's 3500 judges — again a small number relative to the population — but also public 
prosecutors, private practitioners, and the elite of the law school faculties.[2] The result is 
long dockets — an average of a year even for simple civil cases — and, relative to the U.S., a 
small body of case law.[3] In short, whatever the theoretical possibilities are for using courts 
and other quasi-legal fora to resolve contract disputes, the remedies they provide in Japan are 
almost always too little and too late. (Indeed, I am only aware of only one instance in the 
auto industry in which a dispute was taken to court. [4]) The legal system well-nigh forces 
parties to rely upon their own devices. Upham (1987) eloquently argues that this reflects a 
deliberate choice by the government during the post-WWII era, and he and Haley (1991) 
provide other examples besides Contracts where formal law plays a minor role relative to the 
U.S.[5] In any event, formal contracts tend to be brief ~ one typewritten page — and leave 
many details to be specified elsewhere.[6] As a result, except for international transactions 
and the occasional real estate case, lawyers are not involved in drafting contracts.[7] 
Of course, a sophisticated commercial economy is symptomatic of an environment of 
interfirm specialization and the routine reliance upon transactions with other legal entities. 
There is clearly a need for some sort of framework for governing these everyday transactions. 
The standard assumption has been that, absent a Hobbesian legal order, anarchy reigns. But 
the Japanese example makes this claim suspect, though even in the best of circumstances 
there is seldom time to wait for a court to act in the real world. Still, whatever the 
framework, these independent parties must reach an accord on price and other transaction 
terms, and so contracting (though not Contracts) remains important. For less complex 
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transactions, parties may insure themselves against problems by dividing business up into 
small units with different parties.[8] But another alternative is to try to do all business on the 
basis of "relational" contracts. What I outline here is the manner in which the auto industry 
structures transactions, contracting on the basis of trust rather than on the basis of Contracts. 
The Auto Industry 
Whatever the legal and institutional environment, auto makers face a complex problem in 
contracting for production parts. First, they require up to 20,000 different parts for a single 
vehicle (and more when engine, trim and color variations are included). These parts, 
furthermore, must be produced for the four or more years that a car remains in production. 
Second, many of these parts are unique to a given model: a windshield wiper motor will be 
specific to a single car of one manufacturer. But because the manufacture of a part often 
requires costly tools and dies, the assemblers face strong pressures to purchase from a single 
supplier. Similarly, from the supplier's standpoint such assets can only be used to service one 
customer. There is thus a strong degree of interdependence among parts firms and their 
automotive customers, as transactions are neither "spot" nor short in duration. This is of 
course true whether the supplier is an internal division of the company, the pattern at the U.S. 
Big 3 and particularly at GM and Ford, or an independent firm, the prevalent pattern in Japan, 
where firms are not as vertically integrated. Because of such complexity and 
interdependence, automotive parts purchasing is thus not a typical business transaction, though 
I "believe that the use of this non-representative example is not fatal to my larger argument. 
page 11 
In any event, a little thought experiment provides the clearest way to understand the 
methods that are actually used in the Japanese auto industry. Let us assume that Contracts 
have absolutely no legal standing, so that the parties to a transaction cannot rely on courts or 
other outsiders to enforce a bargain. How, then, can one go about initiating a transaction, and 
then maintaining and reinforcing it over time? 
Commencing Transactions: Conceptual Aspects[9] 
Choose partners carefully. Asa first step, firms must obviously be very careful in choosing 
their partners. Even though in certain aspects Japanese are unusually honest, there are plenty 
of businessmen ready to fleece the presumptuous newcomer. Thus firms ought to and do 
expend energy up front searching among possible suppliers or customers before commencing 
a business relationship. Even in the U.S. it is common sense to run a credit check and, for a 
smaller firm, to check with the Better Business Bureau and similar sources. More generally, 
if a contract is worth only the paper it is written upon, firms ask questions such as: Is senior 
management committed? Will they be interested in doing business next year, too? Do both 
sides get along together personally? Do both sides have a good reputation? And so on. This 
courtship is time-consuming and expensive, and helps explain why business entertainment 
accounts for 1% of Japanese GNP. It is the antithesis of the quick handshake of a go-go 
American businessman. 
Begin gradually. However careful the initial search, the telling is in the making, to twist an 
aphorism. Both parties reduce their risks when the first transactions are small in scale, and 
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are restricted to unimportant items. This serves other functions as well in the automotive 
industry, because the contracting environment is complex and each firm has its idiosyncracies. 
Competence is hard to measure in advance, while terms are complex and most readily learned 
through experience. Can the firm actually deliver quality parts on time as promised? (And 
how does the customer measure quality?) Does deliver in the morning mean by 7 AM or by 
noon? With whom does one communicate regarding a minor hitch? - remembering that a 
minor problem, if not resolved quickly, can stop the assembly line and turn into a major 
disaster. In short, actual transactions are needed to provide a meaningful test of good faith 
and competence. And since minor mistakes are inevitable in the process of learning the 
ropes, it is best to start small. When successful, this process locks parties into closer ties, 
since the costs of first finding new partners and then teaching them the ropes make it 
desirable to continue doing business. When unsuccessful, a small and gradual start facilitates 
damage control. 
Commencing Transactions: Empirical Aspects 
The above advice fits what is observed in the Japanese auto industry. The major of 
automotive suppliers have been dealing with their major customer continuously from day one, 
sometimes for over 50 years. For most auto companies turnover of suppliers is under 5% per 
year. Of course, new entry is similarly rare, to the discomfit of outsiders, both Japanese and 
foreign.[10] Even when a new supplier can gain a foothold, the buildup in volume is slow. 
The resulting frustration for firms unused to that environment has helped turn auto parts into 
an ongoing source of US-Japan bilateral tension. 
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Popular culture reinforces that success is gradual From early in life Japanese are 
taught that it is necessary to persevere in the face of challenges, whether it be at school, 
work, family or riding the subways. One is taught that hierarchy cannot be defeated, and 
indeed must be respected. At the same time no one need, or in fact will, stay forever on the 
bottom rung. Even sports reflect this: while victory in an individual sumo match is decided 
in a momentary struggle, the result is interpreted as reflecting the outcome of years of 
practice that add strength, weight and mental stamina. Furthermore, even the successful 
wrestler can advance but one or two rungs at a time, and so reaching the top takes years of 
effort and (at the last rung) repeated triumphs. 
Because of the recent success of Hawaiian wrestlers, this sports image is now familiar 
to non-Japanese readers. But the same images pervade descriptions of business life. The 
young salesman will carefully cultivate potential clients, perhaps for years, until he (seldom 
she!) is a well-known and even trusted figure. Then, one day, a new need arises, and by dint 
of constant effort he is on hand to serve — while, implicitly, the invisible rival who thus far 
had dominated the business has grown complacent. The result: a token order, but with the 
obvious message that further inroads will follow with continued effort.[ll] 
Never in these stories do we see the jubilant man in the concluding moments waving a 
piece of paper in front of his boss (much less springing the news to his wife!) that "I got the 
contract." First, the news wouldn't be broken to her because, by the time our Dagwood 
Tanaka got home from socializing with customers new and old, his wife would have long 
since been asleep in her room, next to the kids. Second, we do not see the scene in the boss' 
office, either - and when we do, there is no piece of paper. Third, what he would have is 
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not "the" business, but one portion of the business. Indeed, these three scenes are a piece of 
the same cloth, of contracting without Contracts. 
Supporting Ongoing Transactions 
In the Japanese auto industry, firms find it important to maintain ongoing ties. As noted, 
even when the initial courting of two firms goes smoothly, it consumes significant managerial 
resources. For administrative efficiency, it is thus important that relationships be kept on a 
steady and smooth course. Yet as time passes, the complexity of the auto industry makes 
disputes inevitable, in part because initial conditions will not remain in effect as the years 
pass. Furthermore, firms are interdependent across many facets. For example, independent 
parts suppliers account for up to half the engineering hours required to develop a new car, 
including testing designs and drafting final blueprints. Quite literally, a car cannot be 
designed without supplier assistance. (In the U.S., the Big 3 historically undertook this work 
themselves.) Overall, then, it is important to maintain more than a mere facade of 
cooperation. Strategies to maintain and strengthen trust are thus at least as important over the 
long run as exerting care at the start. 
Making credible commitments. Firms strive to make their mutual commitment to the 
transaction tangible, to provide assurance to each other that they have a vested interest in 
continuing the relationship. In Japan, the auto assemblers have avoided vertical integration 
into parts manufacture, and do not maintain production facilities for items such as small metal 
stampings. Unlike GM in the US, which often invested in parts production in competition 
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with outside suppliers, Japanese firms made a clear commitment to purchase from someone. 
This lack of internal capacity in Japan even extends into engineering, as noted above. In turn, 
suppliers have often specialized in the automotive market, and in many cases built dedicated 
production facilities near their prime customers' plants. Both sides are thus visibly 
interdependent, with a clear separation of roles. Furthermore, a supplier typically has 
overlapping contracts for different types of parts with different time horizons. This makes it 
virtually certain that both sides will be interacting into the foreseeable future. In the short 
term it is simply impossible for either side to walk away from the other. Indeed, the auto 
companies have repeatedly bailed out suppliers that suffered large losses due to financial 
speculation, because of the difficulty of finding alternative capacity at other firms. An 
additional reason, of course, is what potential supplier would want to make a substantial 
commitment of resources to a firm that has just let its previous supplier go bankrupt? Indeed, 
it is partly the fact that purchasers entail such costs that makes their commitment credible. 
Establishing rules and norms. Written contracts are exceedingly simple, but the overall 
transaction is not. The timing of delivery, containers, lot sizes and payment methods 
obviously must be fixed, along with myriad other details. But in practice the only 
enforceable contract for parts is normally the monthly purchase order, where a concrete order 
for a specified quantity at a stated price is made for the first time. However, even that 
contracted quantity seldom matches actual deliveries, since under just-in-time production 
controls the actual production schedule is set on the factory floor in response to sales to 
dealerships, while the purchase order reflects planned production based on projected sales. 
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Actual production thus will vary from the forecast reflected in the purchase order, with 
discrepancies reconciled after the fact. In any event, both parties over time learn what each 
expects from the other for these and countless other details. The ongoing nature of the 
relationship permits this to be done, and in a more informal and flexible manner than 
provided by formal Contracts, since the pretence of keeping to the letter of the agreement 
need not be maintained, nor need energy be spent constantly rewriting contracts. 
More important for trust, elaborate norms have been worked out to cover such 
potentially fractious issues as initial pricing, compensation for deviations from projected 
volume, defective parts and engineering changes. In the case of pricing, firms seldom employ 
American-style competitive bidding. Instead, prices are set by adding a pre-specified margin 
to costs, where costs are broken down so as to separate out such objective items as material 
costs. (The supplier must use this fixed margin to cover overhead and provide a profit.) In 
addition, the continuity of transactions in most cases permits the use of previous costs as a 
starting point, with corrections made for the targeted productivity increase for the period, 
which is announced publicly by the auto maker. As many elements of price as possible are 
therefore removed from the bargaining table, either by basing them on historic data or 
currently observable market prices, or by making them a common element to all suppliers. 
And when a contract is lost against a rival, the auto company can provide a concrete reason, 
such as that costs for process X were out of line with that at rival firms. Norms for pricing 
thus provide a wealth of information that both parties can use for future transactions, and 
more important, limit the ability of one or the other side to employ hardball tactics that 
impinge upon trust. 
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The gradual buildup of a contracting relationship provides an opportunity for new 
suppliers to learn the ropes. But the auto companies have also instituted formal means of 
communicating with suppliers as a whole. Each firm has a formal supplier association, with 
newsletters, working committees for technical issues, and regular meetings with senior 
management. In addition, purchasing departments are responsible for monitoring the overall 
flow of information, including that from engineering, marketing and other functions, to try to 
see that wires do not get crossed or issues fall through the cracks. The purchasing 
department thus fulfills a strategic management role, in sharp contrast to the clerical roles that 
purchasing staff played until recently in Detroit. In turn, suppliers maintain a "gatekeeper" 
who plays a similar coordinating function. 
Investing in information and reputation. Even with shared norms and expectations, how can 
one feel confident that they will be honored? The presence of the credible commitments 
outlined above is clearly important. In addition, both suppliers and particularly the auto firms 
invest heavily in reputation. Even if they cannot provide ironclad assurances of future 
performance, they can at least make clear past behavior. Part of this information is obtained 
automatically, in the course of the extensive interactions that take place at the individual level 
between supplier and assembler. But the range of experience of any given firm with the 
treatment of exceptional circumstances will (by definition!) be limited. What will happen if 
the advent of plastics or other new materials makes current production capabilities obsolete? 
Who will bear the costs of an after-the-fact discovery of a major design error? If a customer 
encourages a firm to expand its capacity to produce parts for a new model, but the car flops 
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when it hits the market, are suppliers then left holding the bag? While an individual firm 
may not have faced such issues, at least a few firms in the supplier universe will have done 
so. In addition, a single firm cannot be sure it is being treated fairly when its customer 
demands a price decrease during hard times. Suppliers will want reassurance on these and 
other such what-if scenarios. 
In fact, the auto makers are acutely aware of the need for suppliers to trust them on 
such issues, since the sheer number of parts transactions makes it a practical necessity that as 
the general rule each side accept the other's word without challenge. But most possible 
contingencies will in fact have been faced by at least a few of an auto company's suppliers. 
Here the supplier associations are again important for creating and maintaining trust. The 
occasional meetings of the association as a whole provide a forum for top management at the 
auto companies to present market projections and policy changes to all suppliers equally and 
consistently. The associations are also the organizational nexus through which joint technical 
issues are addressed and new management methods are taught (including in the past cost 
accounting, engineering management, quality control and management information systems). 
Suppliers also interact with each other through these associations on many different levels, 
and not just with their customer. They know a lot about each other, and can readily learn 
how exceptional circumstances were handled, and whether they are receiving equal treatment. 
In addition, the associations provide a route for suppliers to voice their concerns, as the 
directors, typically the CEOs of a cross-section of suppliers, meet regularly with the 
executives of their "parent" company.[12] 
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Avoid threats, provide positive incentives. If the legal system (or a hierarchical analog) does 
not provide glue to hold parties together, then threats are highly dangerous: unless both sides 
want to continue to do business, there is ultimately nothing to bind them. Threats are 
antithetical to the credibility of commitments, and can rapidly extinguish any trust that has 
been built up over time. Furthermore, as repeatedly stressed above, complexity and 
interdependence make willing cooperation crucial; both sides in general must be willing to go 
the extra kilometer. 
The psychology literature supports the importance of socialization and of a gradual 
buildup to a relationship, and the strength of positive incentives over threats.[13] Of course, 
when outside sanctions are unavailable, a threat to terminate a Contract (or a promise not to) 
holds no force in and of itself. But the entire contracting environment seeks to minimize the 
role of threats, from the use of rules that keep gross margins sacrosanct in the price-setting 
process, to the explicit policy of not dropping a supplier without strong cause, and even then 
not doing so suddenly. A troubled firm in fact often turns to its customer (and/or suppliers) 
for assistance to overcome difficulties in remaining competitive, or for help in recovering 
from gross management mistakes. At the same time, the auto makers seek to steer new 
business to existing suppliers when possible, and strive to keep profits high enough for their 
suppliers to be willing and able to keep investing in new production equipment. Another aid 
to limiting conflict is that suppliers simultaneously are making several hundred or even 
thousand different parts. The multiplicity of contracts of different value, complexity and 
duration allows both sides to balance a loss in one potential dispute with a profit on another 
transaction. As Ellickson (1991) noted, and the mathematical theory of repeated games 
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shows, it is far easier to bury the hatchet and maintain cooperation when the books do not 
have to be closed at the end of each transaction. 
Summary 
Automotive contracting in Japan relies upon trust; both parties put themselves at the risk of 
loss, without assurance of long-term gain, out of the belief that the other party would not take 
unfair advantage of them. But in a business environment blind trust is foolish, and reliance 
upon personal trust among individual members of larger organizations is equally untenable. 
Nor can either side systematically structure the relationship so that the other party is 
effectively compelled by commercial considerations or legal threat to always carry through 
even to the bitter end. 
Ultimately, then, contracting in Japan is governed neither by recourse to legal 
authority nor by reliance upon command within an organizational hierarchy.[14] Instead both 
sides invest substantial resources to obtain information and generate reputation about past 
behavior and future expectations. This is buttressed by the establishment of norms, the 
fostering of communication channels and the adoption of measures to reduce risk by a search 
process and the structuring of initial transactions. There is nothing in these methods, of 
course, that limits their applicability to the auto industry or to Japan. Indeed, I am convinced 
that even cursory empirical research will show that such techniques are widely employed (if 
poorly conceptualized) in the U.S. 
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III. Concluding Thoughts 
In the introduction I argued that contract law is not a prerequisite of a commercial economy; 
the above description of contracting parties in the Japanese auto industry has given a sense of 
how contracting without Contracts can operate. Few transactions in Japan lead to disputes, 
and most disputes are resolved amicably outside the shadow of the law — as in the U.S. 
While readers ought to be skeptical of my academic revisionism, it is surely both 
disingenuous and a disservice for lawyers to claim that documenting Contracts is their job, 
and contracting is solely that of their customers. Surely the specialization and breadth of 
exposure of lawyers ought to leave them ideally equipped to provide the latter, invaluable 
service. It is ultimately a legal fiction that contract law governs business transactions. The 
profession should not permit an unwarranted faith in both the importance and necessity of law 
to turn lawyers into mere clerks. As Macaulay (1985:480) phrased it, "Students must 
understand a game to learn to play it well." 
At the same time, organizational theorists need to avoid making the similar error of 
focusing on the form of an organization and ignoring the actual workings of individuals and 
the means through which transactions are carried out. In the Japanese auto industry, many 
highly complex interactions occur on an ongoing basis across organizational boundaries. The 
day-to-day partner of an automotive engineer may be a supplier engineer seconded to the next 
desk, or attached to the same computer network. Pfeffer and Baron (1988) argue that such 
blurring of organizational membership is widespread in the U.S. as well. More generally, as 
Powell (1990) argues, it strains both received concepts and commonsense language to classify 
such interactions as an admixture of "market" and "hierarchy" rather than as something 
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qualitatively distinct. But while organizational theory may be better aware of the gap 
between form and function, caution remains in order. Even Coase (1992), assuredly an astute 
student of transactions, finds it difficult to move away from the assumption of the centrality 
of formal institutions. To me it is ironic that he is currently involved is an effort to assemble 
a large collection of formal contracts of large corporations. 
In closing, however, let me pose a parallel conjecture about organizations: that trust 
will prove equally central to the smooth handling of transactions among members of the same 
firm, and not merely to those between firms. Trust, I posit, is not only the substance of 
contracting, but the substance of bureaucracy. I have for now few insights as to how formal 
rules and structures within organizations support trust, and the extent to which they are 
essential. (But see, for example, Sitkin and Roth, forthcoming.) However, I believe the same 
null hypothesis — that formal structures are unnecessary -- will provide a fruitful starting 
point for clarifying the essential elements of formal organization, just as I believe it will 
clarify the role of contract law. 
page 23 
REFERENCES 
Acheson, J. M. (1991) The Lobster Gangs of Maine, University Press of New England. 
Arai, S. (1991) Shoshaman. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Bestor, T. (1993) Tokyo's Marketplace: Culture and Trade in the Tsukiji Wholesale Fish 
Market. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Black, D. (1976) The Behavior of Law. New York: Academic Press. 
Choy, J. (1992) Japan's Legal System: Agent or Barrier to Change? JEI Report, No 43A 
(November 13). 
Coase, R. H. (1992) The Institutional Structure of Production [Nobel Prize Lecture of 
December 9, 1991], American Economic Review. 82(4), 713-719. 
Dore, R. (1983) Goodwill and the Spirit of Market Capitalism. British Journal of Sociology, 
34(4), 459-482. 
(1986). Flexible Rigidities. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Ellickson, R. C. (1991) Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
Gambetta, D., Ed. (1988) Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. London, 
England: Basil Blackwell. 
Gilmore, G. (1974) The Death of Contract. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press. 
Haley, J. O. (1991) Authority without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox, New York 
and London: Oxford University Press. 
page 24 
Harris, D. and Veljanovski, C. (1986) The Use of Economics to Elucidate Legal Concepts: 
The Law of Contract. In T. Daintith and G. Teubner (Eds.), Contract and 
Organization: Legal Analysis in the Light of Economic and Social Theory (pp. 109-
120). New York and Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
Helper, S. (1991) How Much Has Really Changed between U.S. Automakers and Their 
Suppliers? Sloan Management Review. (Summer), 15-28. 
— (1990) Comparative Supplier Relations in the U.S. and Japanese Auto Industries: An 
Exit/Voice Approach. Economic and Business History, 2nd series, 19, 152-161. 
-— (1986) Supplier Relations and Technical Change: Theory and Application to the U.S. 
Automobile Industry. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Economics, Harvard 
University. 
Iwata, R. (1982) Japanese-Style Management: Its Foundation and Prospects. Tokyo, Japan: 
Asian Productivity Organization. 
Joskow, P. L. (1985) Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-
Burning Electric Generating Plants, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization. 
1(1), 33-80. 
Lorenz, E.H. (1988) Neither Friends nor Strangers: Informal Networks of Subcontracting in 
French Industry. In Gambetta, D. (Ed.), Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative 
Relations. London, England: Basil Blackwell. 
Macaulay, S. (1963) Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, American 
Sociological Review, 28, 55-67. 
page 25 
Macneil, I. (1985) Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, Wisconsin Law 
Review, 1985(3), 483-525. 
Moorman, C , Zaltman, G. & Deshpande, R. (1992) Relationships Between Providers and 
Users of Market Research: The Dynamics of Trust Within and Between Organizations, 
Journal of Marketing Research, 29, 314-328. 
Nishiguchi, T. (1993) Strategic Industrial Sourcing: The Japanese Advantage. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pfeffer, J. & Baron, J. N. (1988) Taking the Workers Back Out: Recent Trends in the 
Structuring of Employment. In B.M. Straw & L.L. Cummings, (Eds.), Research in 
Organizational Behavior, vol. 10. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Powell, W.W. (1990) Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization. In B.M. 
Staw & L.L. Cummings, (Eds.), Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 12, 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press. 
Sako, Mari (1993) Prices, Quality and Trust: Japanese and British Management of Buyer-
Supplier Relations. England: Oxford University Press. 
— (1991) The Role of "Trust" in Japanese Buyer-Seller Relationships, Ricerche Economiche, 
45:2-3, 449-474. 
Silin, R.H. (1972) Marketing and Credit in a Hong Kong Wholesale Market. In W.E. 
Willmott, (Ed.), Economic Organization in China, Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Sitkin, S.B. and Roth, N.R. (forthcoming). Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic 
"Remedies" for Trust/Distrust, Organizational Science. 
page 26 
Smitka, M. (1991) Competitive Ties: Subcontracting in the Japanese Automotive Industry, 
New York: Columbia University Press. 
-— (1992). The Decline of the Japanese Auto Industry: Domestic and International 
Implications. Working Paper, Center on Japanese Economy and Business, Graduate 
School of Business, Columbia University. 
Tamiya, H. (1992) Nihon no Saiban [The Japanese Court System], Tokyo: Kobundo. 
Uchida, T. (1990) Keiyaku no Saisei [Resurrection of Contract], Tokyo: Kobundo. 
Ueda, K. (1987) Jidosha ni okeru Shitauke Kanri [The Management of Subcontracting], Shoko 
Kinyu 62(9,12). 
Upham, R (1987) Law and Social Change in Japan, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Williamson, O.E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, NJ: Free Press. 
-— (1975) Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications, NJ: Free Press. 
page 27 
ENDNOTES 
1. Other studies use organizational theory as a framework. See Moorman et ah (1992). 
2. Tamiya (1992:19, 56-57). There are however several types of paralegals specializing 
in tax, patent and administrative filings, tasks that are largely clerical in nature. There 
is also a mediation (chotei) system that mobilizes community leaders and other lay 
individuals to attempt to resolve disputes brought into courts. Bureaucrats and police 
also play such roles. In addition, Japanese law schools admit about 30,000 
undergraduates a year. Business newspapers carry regular "how-to" columns, and 
bookstores all contain sections on law for businessmen. Even if the knowledge of law 
school graduates is modest, it is thus wrong to automatically conclude that 
businessmen are totally ignorant of the law. Whether they make use of this 
knowledge is of course a separate issue. 
3. Uchida (1990). Japan is a civil law jurisdiction, so that in principle the discretion of 
judges is more narrowly restricted to applying statutes. These, however, are phrased 
in general terms and courts do not have a high reputation for consistency. 
Furthermore, judges try to force disputants to privately mediate their differences, and 
final judgments exhibit a strong tendency to split down the middle rather than to find 
fully for one or the other party. For a brief overview of current issues, see Choy 
(1992). 
4. Ueda (1987). This case was filed by the union of a company that went bankrupt after 
an automotive customer abruptly canceled its contracts. I am told that ultimately a 
modest settlement was reached out of court. 
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5. I did not come across Haley's work until after this article was in process, and so do 
not fully integrate his study here. 
6. Even then, many agreements are oral and may not specify price or other variables that 
would be needed for a proper Contract. Written documentation is most prevalent in 
response to specific government guidance, as with the Subcontractor Law that seeks to 
regularize the terms of subcontracting arrangements (my own research) or to satisfy 
regulators in the Tokyo fish market (discussion with Theodore Bestor). 
7. Many Japanese businessmen are graduates of law faculties, as noted. Furthermore, 
large firms often maintain legal departments. However, virtually no firms in Japan 
employ a full-time lawyer. In addition, I am told that legal department staff are not 
always graduates of law faculties, and are in any case rotated to other functional 
positions in 2-3 years, so that the depth of expertise is not great. 
8. As an example of self-insurance, most stores in the small town in which I reside 
readily accept personal checks for small amounts. Indeed, one store no longer accepts 
credit cards, having found that losses from the occasional bad check were in the 
aggregate less that the 3%-5% fee that card companies levy on small stores. 
9. The following discussion draws heavily on Smitka (1991:Chapter 6). 
10. Structural shift in the Japanese auto industry is now producing greater opportunities 
for new entry. Technologies are evolving rapidly, permitting new firms to break in, 
while the rapid rise in labor costs has hurt the competitiveness of many domestic auto 
parts firms. This is providing a window of opportunity for exports from the U.S. and 
elsewhere. See Smitka (1992). 
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11. Iwata (1982) offers such anecdotes in English; see, too, the several "business novels" 
now available in translation, e.g., Arai (1991). 
12. See Helper (1990) on "voice" versus "exit" in auto parts contracting in the U.S. 
13. See the essays in Gambetta (1988) and Sitkin & Roth (forthcoming). 
14. Despite much discussion of "keiretsu," in the automotive industry the assemblers in 
general do not have equity ties or other means of potential control over their suppliers. 
The "keiretsu" are thus a reflection of the desired continuity of transactions, and are 
not a "hierarchy" to which the auto companies can issue commands. 
